Page 105 - SAMENA Trends - February 2020

ARTICLE SAMENA TRENDS

and communications infrastructure concerns that the agency identifies for 5G. equipment with known or suspected
moving forward, as well as all vendors. The agency highlighted that the use of 5G vulnerabilities
The following security requirements are components manufactured by untrusted • Development of trusted 5G
planned for the telecommunications companies could expose US entities to technologies, services, and products
networks: risks especially since the technology 2.4 Summary of the measures taken
• Systems to only be sourced from will use more components than previous There are several overlapping objectives
trustworthy suppliers who comply generations of wireless networks. and procedures that have been observed
with national security regulations in the steps taken by the three countries.
and provisions for the secrecy of The report suggested several measures the Each have clearly highlighted the
telecommunications and data US Government could take to reduce the underlying concerns and objectives of
• Network traffic to be monitored risks of deploying a 5G network including: the new requirement including consumer
regularly for any abnormality and • Use of 5G network components protection, business protection and/or
appropriate protection measures to manufactured by trusted companies national security. Moreover, the areas of
be taken in case of a concern since the proliferation of the focus within these requirements include
• Only certified security-related technology’s infrastructure may codes of conduct, monitoring obligations,
network and system components to provide malicious actors more attack choice of vendor/supplier, standards
be used vectors of equipment, staff and stakeholder
• Only trained professionals to be • Promoting open, transparent and measures and notification requirements.
employed in security-related areas consensus–driven international
and professionally competent, standards and processes that do The figure below highlights the
reliable and trustworthy contractors not place trusted companies at a commonalities in the approach taken by
to be selected for system-related disadvantage Australia, USA and Germany to address 5G
process outsourcing • Limiting the adoption of 5G cybersecurity concerns.
• Adequate redundancy to be available
for critical, security-related network
and system components

2.3 United States of America

In July 2019, the US’ Cybersecurity &
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
released a Critical Infrastructure Security
and Resilience Note pinpointing the security Figure 3: Measures taken by the three countries for 5G cybersecurity

105 FEBRUARY 2020